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HON. JOSEPH T. SNEED*
When I was a young law professor, recently released from military service,
Jerome Frank's emphasis on the importance, as well as the intrinsic
uncertainty, of the facts in a lawsuit struck me as interesting.' However, this
emphasis did not seem immediately useful in my efforts to teach Contracts and
what was then known as Bills and Notes and Sales. My concerns were to
communicate the rules and to illustrate their scope through the use of the facts
of cases, compiled in a book by a much older and more experienced professor,
and my own often hastily constructed hypothetical fact situations.
Seldom was I concerned with how facts came to be or with their possible
uncertainty and ambiguity. Facts were either what the cases in books, or I in
my hypotheticals, said they were. After all, it was law, not facts (however
determined) that I was teaching. My colleagues in the fields of procedure and
evidence could take care of "the facts."
In my years as an appellate judge, I have come to appreciate Frank's view
of "facts." Of course, the access of appellate judges to the facts is limited to the
record and the portions of oral argument that are both consistent with the facts
and helpful. Briefs that accurately state what is in the record, and that correctly
cite thereto, are helpful. However, all too often the citations are faulty and their
factual recitations are both partial and infected with partisan bias. As a
consequence, even though I read the brief as my duty requires and usually am
aided by a clerk-prepared bench memorandum, I frequently examine pertinent
portions of the record.
The record, however, presents only a "version" of the facts. As Frank
taught us, each witness to the "facts" captures a "version" which frequently is
altered over time for many reasons, some inadvertent and some not.2
Moreover, the record itself is sometimes inconsistent, incomplete, or
ambiguous. Nonetheless, the appellate judge must apply the "law" to these
"facts"; however, the "law" frequently is neither required nor permitted to
ignore inconsistencies, incompleteness, or ambiguities. Finally, the appellate
judge must know and adhere to the record as received from the lower court and
compiled by the parties. Nothing so quickly undermines the credibility of an
opinion as a demonstrable failure to present the record accurately.
* Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
1 See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL; MYrH AND REALrrY iN AmmPRICAN JUSTICE
(1949).
2 FRANK, supra, note 1, at 17.
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It is at this point that the appellate judging process approaches the point of
commitment. Prior to this point, at least for most judges, the process is one in
which several alternative resolutions of the case have been considered and have
been either temporarily rejected or tentatively classified as possible solutions.
The study of the facts, informed to some extent by the arguments set forth in
the briefs, exerts some force in this sifting process.
Slowly, or in some instances quickly, one alternative emerges within the
mind of the judge as the one most reasonably compatible with the facts, the text
of the law, and most importantly, the judge's sense of what is right, proper,
and just. The judge at this point very likely will begin to frame an opinion in
his mind and sometimes even attempt the drafting of one or two of the key
paragraphs of the envisioned disposition.
For most federal appellate courts, this entire process takes place before oral
argument. This approach explains why such arguments often resemble the
chorus of attorneys supporting the melody of argument among the sitting
judges. In any event, viewpoints, once tentative, tend to become more positive
during oral argument and frequently are stated with firmness in the panel
conference thereafter. The opinion expressed during the panel conference is
seldom substantially altered later, although there is often some jockeying
between the majority and a dissenting judge over the precise language of their
respective opinions.
At this juncture, one is entitled to ask: What was it that made that one
alternative that surfaced during the judge's preparation emerge as the preferred
one? Isn't that the critical event in the judging of a legal dispute? Certainly it is
the initial critical point. However, the source of that single alternative will
always remain a mystery. Based on my observations and self-analysis of almost
a quarter of a century, I can only make these comments.
Each judge has a personal history commencing centuries before his birth.
That is, each of us, including judges, has ancestors whose experiences are
transmitted from generation to generation and which in many quiet and even
stealthy ways make up the culture into which each is born. Be it exalted,
wretched, or somewhere in between, its influence is there, whether manifested
by one's revulsion and revolt, prideful acceptance, or once more something in
between.
We Americans, often for good reasons, deny this reality. This denial has
legitimate sources; we do inhabit a land we seized from others who long
preceded us and on which we have brought a nation to the forefront of the
present world's civilizations. We share the feeling that in some way we must be
unique and the claims of the past must be rejected. To so aspire is noble, but in
no way can we wholly escape our past. Its grip is tenacious.
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Nonetheless, the individual judge is more than his or her cultural past.
Each brings to judging intelligence, training, and experience in life, all melding
to yield a unique person and judge. It is this past, both distant and recent, that
leads to political affiliations that usually fix one's eligibility for appointment or
election to the bench. Also, this past, again both distant and recent, heavily
influences the emergence of that preferred alternative selected by the judge
during the early stages of his or her study of the case.
Applicable precedents can preclude that alternative, but few judges will
surrender meekly. Efforts to find viable distinctions will be made. But
"viability" is not a rigid concept. In determining its presence, the judge will
consult related cases, law reviews, applicable texts, as well as a personal
estimate of the probable attitudes of those colleagues who will also sit on the
case. At this point the judge's intellectual integrity is put to the test. Will
affection for the preferred alternative lead to an embrace of spurious
distinctions of relevant precedent? Or will the judge reluctantly surrender that
alternative and bow to authority? This dilemma is where the quiet inner battles
of a judge are fought. Only over a substantial period of time can the wise
observer know how well a particular judge handles those struggles.
With either a sense of "justice being done" or "surrender to imperfect
law," the judge proceeds to ready himself for oral argument. Assignment to a
clerk to prepare a supplementary memorandum and more "book time" for the
judge may be necessary before the judge's confidence in the selected result is
strong enough to permit turning to another case on the calendar.
As this process repeats itself, memoranda from other judges on the panel
may appear which can either strengthen or weaken the recipient's perception of
the case. In any event, in due course preparation for hearing of the calendar is
completed. The troublesome cases in which there is either doubt or conflict
among the members of the panel are identified.
Oral argument tests these preconceptions of the judges. Of course, the
attorneys are given the opportunity to make their arguments, but often
primarily by parrying the hostile questions of a doubting judge. A silent judge
generally is either already convinced that the attorney's position is correct or
considers it a hopeless cause. There are exceptions, but they are rare.
When the last attorney has spoken and the court adjourned, the panel
commences its deliberations. Because the differences, as well as the
agreements, among the panel members are well known at this point, the
deliberations usually proceed rather quickly. Troublesome cases where
uncertainty prevails are put aside, while those whose results are clear are
assigned by the presiding judges for the preparation of dispositions. Those
presenting difficulties also are assigned as the presiding judge chooses, with the
understanding that any resolution employed by that judge is tentative.
1996]
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Frequently it is the presiding judge who undertakes this effort to find a
consensus.
Preparation of the opinion usually is a fairly straight-forward undertaking.
In the days of Learned Hand and earlier, the opinion was the work of the judge
exclusively. However, with the litigation explosion of the post-World War LI
era, however, most initial drafts are now prepared by a clerk, preferably the
one who prepared the bench memorandum pertaining to the case. However,
many judges, including myself when time permits, will undertake the initial
draft of a case of either particular complexity or of special interest to the judge.
In any event, it is rare for an opinion to be circulated to other judges on the
panel prior to a thorough review and often extensive revisions by the judge to
whom the duty of preparing the opinion was assigned.
Thereafter, within various time spans, concurrences from the two non-
writing panel members are indicated. The degree of attention given to a fellow
judge's opinion varies greatly from judge to judge, even when a judge concurs
in the result. Experience as a judge usually accelerates such reviews.
The situation of a dissenting judge is quite different. That judge has been
thinking about the case since the day of the conference; clerks have been
alerted and directed to pursue various avenues of research and the judge may
have commenced the draft of the dissent prior to the receipt of the majority
opinion. In due course, the dissent is completed and presented to the majority.
What may follow is unpredictable, except that seldom does a dissenting opinion
become the majority view. A more common pattern is that the interactions
between the two camps will lead to various modifications of both majority and
minority opinions. Seldom does each side hold firm on the precise language of
its original formulation of its position.
Once a disposition is filed, there sometimes erupts a clamor by one or
more judges, not members of the panel, of strong objections to either the
result, the reasoning, or both. En bane calls are made or threatened. A flurry of
memoranda are exchanged; charges, counter charges, affirmations, and denials
fly from one chambers to another. Indeed, these often constitute the most
interesting writings of an appellate court. A successful en bane call initiates a
new round of preparation for oral argument and decision-making for those
active judges who are members of the en bane court and who did not hear the
case initially.
En bane hearings and opinion preparations follow roughly the pattern
applicable to three-judge panels, except that each step is more time consuming
and complex. The larger the en bane court, the greater are these difficulties.
Concurrently, the regular flow of hearing calendars also continues. Each
judge's file drawers are full of unheard appeals. The judge again picks up
briefs he or she has never seen before. He or she starts to read, and while
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doing so, several alternative resolutions emerge which he or she weighs,
revises, casts aside, and retrieves, slowly settling on one, or several, strong
possibilities. Another cycle of decision-making is underway.

